This study explores the roles that three kinds of nonfinancial variables-people, patents and policies-play in generating firms' near-term annual sales revenue. Due to data limitations on these variables for public companies, I use a rich and detailed set of information taken from surveys of private venture-backed firms conducted by VentureOne. By means of a CobbDouglas-type revenue model, I find that firms' one-year-ahead forecasts of sales revenue are larger the higher are their current revenues; the more rapidly their personnel and granted patents are growing; the more business development, finance, marketing, sales, technical and other staff they employ; and when a formal sales commission plan is in place. Forecasted revenues are lower when firms are in the development and clinical trials stages of life, but are uncorrelated with the number of administrative employees and the presence of a defined bonus compensation plan. My results add to the growing literature on how and why nonfinancial statement variables are associated with financial statement outcomes. They also suggest that the top-line forecasts made by young companies are not entirely the 'creative fiction' that is sometimes alleged.
1.

Introduction
Sales revenue is a vital part of firms' creation of wealth and their financial statements, because sales revenue is the main business channel through which assets-in-place and growth opportunities are converted into cash. The goal of this paper is to explore the roles that three types of nonfinancial statement information-people, patents and policies-play in determining corporate sales revenues.
I choose to focus on people, patents and policies because there are strong economic reasons for expecting that these variables will be important in generating revenue. For example, firms habitually declare that people are their most important asset. Technology companies constantly strive to establish property rights to monopolistic revenue streams through their patents. And many firms put in place formal policies such as bonus plans and sales commission schemes in order to compensate and motivate their managers and sales employees.
Prior work into understanding sales revenue has been largely unable to evaluate the roles played by people, patents and policies because in publicly traded companies, disclosures about these items either rarely exist (patents and policies) or they are highly aggregated (people).
I address this problem by instead analyzing private venture-backed firms, because for them a rich set of detailed data is available in the form of VentureOne's semi-annual compensation surveys.
In addition to compensation data, VentureOne collects specific data on firms' one-year-ahead revenue forecasts and a variety of other business data-in particular, the number of employees in various job categories and the types of compensation policies firms have in place. To this indepth set of variables I add patent data that I collected online from the U.S. Patent Office.
Beyond data availability, I argue that private venture-backed firms also offer a powerful setting in which to evaluate the relevance of nonfinancial statement information to sales revenue because sales revenue is especially material to the survival and success of such companies.
Unlike mature firms that typically have multiple product or service lines, a diversified customer base and low external financing needs, entrepreneurial companies-especially the young, hightech firms that absorb the vast majority of venture capital funding-have a single or only a few products or services, sell to a concentrated set of customers, and consume large amounts of outside equity capital before they turn cash-flow-positive. This makes the marginal impact of new or lost revenue much larger and more important for them than for publicly traded firms.
Following Lev and Radhakrishnan (2005) , I model revenue using a multi-input CobbDouglas-type production function that is tailored to exploit VentureOne's unique data on people, patents and policies, and to finesse the lack of data about firms' tangible assets. I posit that sales revenue fundamentally depends on firms' tangible assets, intangible assets, personnel employed (in total, and by job function), compensation policies, and life-stage. Then, because VentureOne does not ask firms to provide data about their tangible assets, I substitute out tangible assets in the revenue production function using lagged revenues and the assumption that tangible assets evolve exponentially over time. This yields a reduced form model in which one-year-ahead revenue depends on both financial statement and nonfinancial variables. Specifically, the model posits that one-year-ahead revenues are increasing in current-period revenues; in the level and the one-year-ahead rate of growth in intangible assets; in the forecasted rate of growth in employees and the number of employees in business development, finance, marketing, sales and technical functions; and in the presence of a formal sales commission plan and a defined bonus plan. One-year-ahead revenues are predicted to be unrelated to the number of administrative employees, and smaller in the development and clinical trials stages of a firm's life.
I test these predictions using a large cross-section of proprietary and nonpublic one-yearahead revenue forecasts made by firms that responded to VentureOne's spring 2004 and 2005 surveys of U.S. private venture-backed companies. Test results are consistent with almost all predictions. For the set of 1,133 venture-backed companies in VentureOne's surveys with the requisite data, I find that firms' forecasts of one-year-ahead revenues are larger the higher are their current revenues; the more rapid the growth in their patents and total labor force; the more business development, finance, marketing, sales, technical and 'other' staff they employ; and if they have a formal sales commission plan in place. Projected revenues are reliably lower during the development and clinical trials stages of firms' lives, but are uncorrelated with the number of administrative employees and the presence of a defined bonus plan. The log-linear model explains 81% of the cross-sectional variation in forecasted revenues. Of the regression adjusted R 2 , 13% is unique to financial statement data, 6% is unique to nonfinancial information, and 62% is common to both.
I also estimate the revenue model separately for each of VentureOne's three key industry sectors: Healthcare, Information Technology, and Retail/Consumer/Business Products/Services.
Consistent with the conjecture that a more rapidly growing workforce generates higher sales, in all three industries I find that one-year-ahead revenue forecasts are significantly positively related to firms' forecasts of their one-year-ahead rate of growth in total employees. The explanatory power of specialized job functions is higher in the Healthcare and Information to what is known about the relevance of nonfinancial variables in determining sales revenue, a crucial and fundamental measure of corporate financial performance. Prior research using publicly traded firms has already shown that the level of and growth in revenues are associated with order backlog (Liu et al., 1996) , customer satisfaction (Ittner and Larcker, 1998; Nagar and Rajan, 2005) , operational measures of product quality (Nagar and Rajan, 2001 ), internet traffic (Trueman et al., 2001) , and network effects (Rajgopal et al., 2003) . To this set I add the growth in firms' patents, the growth in total employees, the contributions made by different types of employees, and the presence of a formal sales commission plan.
Second, this study also enlarges our knowledge of the business economics underlying the top-line component of venture-backed firms' financial statements. As noted by Gompers and Lerner (2000) , the National Venture Capital Association (2004) and Stolis and Goodman (2004) , venture-backed firms are a major force in the modern U.S. economy. For example, in 2003 venture-backed companies employed over 10 million U.S. workers and generated $1.8 trillion in sales, corresponding to 9.4% of total U.S. private sector employment and 9.6% of total U.S.
company sales. A number of studies have identified variables that explain venture-backed firms' equity values and returns Lerner, 1998, 2000; Lerner, 1994; Seppä, 2003; Hand, 2005a, b; . Other research has sought to investigate the varied roles that accounting systems and financial information play in their business development and maturation Davila and Foster, 2005) and growth in employees, average salaries and turnover around funding dates (Davila et al., 2003) . My study contributes to this stream of work by focusing on sales revenue, a vital determinant of profitability and equity value. In doing so, I
show that the revenue forecasts made by private venture-backed companies are far from being the 'creative fiction' that is sometimes alleged. In the cross-section, revenue forecasts made by private venture-backed companies appear to sensibly incorporate a variety of economically crucial financial and nonfinancial factors.
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 briefly summarizes the literature on the determinants of revenue, and motivates my focus on people, patents and policies. Section 3 describes the VentureOne survey dataset. In section 4, I develop a CobbDouglas-type revenue production model tailored to venture-backed companies and use it to predict which variables in the VentureOne dataset will explain variation in firms' projected oneyear-ahead revenue. Section 5 reports the results of several empirical analyses that test these predictions. Section 6 notes the major limitations of the study, and section 7 concludes.
Literature review and motivation
Many academics and practitioners argue that sales revenue is the most fundamental driver of corporate value (Holliday, 2000; Wall Street Journal, Sept. 25, 2000; Lundholm and Sloan, 2004; Penman, 2004; Ghosh et al., 2005) . Although net income has been far more intensely studied than has sales revenue, accounting scholars have begun to study the determinants of sales, focusing in particular on the role played by, or the associations with, nonfinancial information. In a variety of innovative settings, this work has found that the level and rate of growth in revenues are associated with order backlog, customer satisfaction, operational measures of product quality, internet traffic, and network effects. Liu et al. (1996) , Ittner and Larcker (1998) , Nagar and Rajan (2001 ), Trueman et al. (2001 and Rajgopal et al. (2003 Haught, President and CEO states "It is common to hear companies claim that 'people are our most important asset.' At Pella Corporation, I truly believe that people are the basis for our success. Our recognition as an industry leader in quality and innovation is possible because of talented, creative people and a culture that appreciates and nurtures that tradition." 3 Marketing researchers have studied sales force compensation for some time, most recently from an agencytheoretic perspective (e.g., Farley, 1964; Basu et al., 1985; Coughlan and Sen, 1989; Coughlan et al., 1992; Raju and Srinivasan, 1996; Mantrala et al., 1997) . Accounting and finance scholars have extensively analyzed the relations between management bonus schemes, performance and earnings management (e.g., Healy, 1985; Tehranian and Wegelein, 1985; Holthausen et al., 1995; Banker et al., 2001) . Economists and human resource academics alike have studied the impacts of human resource management policies on corporate performance (e.g., Huselid, 1995; Ichniowski and Shaw, 2003) . 4 Under Regulation S-K, the SEC requires that in Item 1 of their 10-K, registrants report the number of persons employed to the extent that such information is material to an understanding of the registrant's business as a whole. Empirically, over the period , the percentage of firms that Compustat reported had positive total assets and that reported the total number of their employees was 85%. An inspection of a random sample of 20 firms' websites indicates that firms directly disclose on their website the total number of their employees (as opposed to referring the reader to their 10-K) about 15% of the time. However, none of the 20 disclosed details as to how many employees they had in different areas, such as marketing, finance, technical, administrative, etc.
3.
Data
The data in this study come predominantly from proprietary surveys undertaken by I then merged the data from VentureOne's surveys with VentureOne's financing and general support databases and patent data. VentureOne's financing database contains a record of each firm's equity financing history, where available. For each round of funding, the financing database reports the amount of money raised, when the round closed, the pre-and post-money valuations, the type of round (e.g., First, Second, Individual Investor), the firm's business status (e.g., Startup, Product Development, Shipping), and the type and ID code of each investor that participated in the round. The general support database contains general information about each firm, such as its industry, state, and telephone area code, as well as details on current and former senior management and board members, such as their title, type (e.g., outside board member, venture investor board member) and whether they are or were one of the firm's founders. The number of patents granted to each firm as of June 30 of the most recently completed fiscal year and June 30 of the forecasted year ahead were obtained from www.uspto.gov. 5 The author was granted access to VentureOne's data after signing a strict nondisclosure agreement. Table 1 lists the restrictions that I placed on VentureOne's databases in order to be able to estimate a Cobb-Douglas-type sales revenue model. Of the roughly 5,000 venture-backed firms to whom VentureOne emailed its compensation survey, a total of 1,296 responded. 6 Of these, 42
were eliminated because they had been acquired or had merged, were already public or in IPO registration, or had gone out of business. This yielded 1,254 firms that were truly private and independent venture-backed companies. Untabulated analysis indicated that respondents were not significantly different from nonrespondents. 7 From this set, 121 firms were excluded because they were missing one or more data items needed to estimate the revenue model. Using data available in VentureOne's aggregate financing and valuation database (which did not include compensation data), less than 1% of the variance could be explained. The independent variables used were the age of the firm, the date of its most recent round of equity financing, the number of its most recent round of equity financing (e.g., 1 st , 2 nd , etc.), the amount raised in that round, the state in which the firm is headquartered, its lifestage (e.g., start-up, product development, beta testing, shipping, profitable, clinical trials, and restart), and the industry sector the firm. This analysis notwithstanding, in private correspondence VentureOne indicated that in their view firms that anticipate seeking further funding from venture capital funds are most likely to respond to the survey. midpoint of the range (e.g., a category 5 response was recoded as $7.5 mil.). Revenue category 7 was coded as $60 mil. 8 The mean revenue categories for actual and forecasted revenues are 2.6 and 3.7, respectively (table 2, panel A). Mean dollar revenues are $7.5 mil. and $13.0 mil., respectively. These figures suggest that venture-backed firms believe their revenues will grow rapidly. This reinforces a key assumption of this study, viz. that revenues and revenue growth are key performance measures for these companies. The mean log growth rate in revenues is 0.83 (i.e., 129%) and the unreported median percentage growth rate is 100%. employees, respectively (panel A). The mean log change in forecasted headcount is 0.32 (i.e., 38%) and the unreported median percentage growth rate is 25%. Firms therefore expect to grow their workforce quite rapidly, although at a markedly slower rate than revenues.
In addition, indicates that there is substantial variation in the types of human capital skills that employees hold in startups, as judged by job functions (panel A). The mean number of employees ranges from 1.1 in business development to 8.8 in sales to 21 in 'Other' positions.
There also exists substantial variation in the number of patents granted to firms, my proxy for intangible assets. Midway through the forecasted (prior) fiscal year, the mean number of patents that had been granted to sample firms was 2.1 (1.6), but the maximum was 95 (94 
Sales revenue model
Young entrepreneurial businesses combine capital and labor to create economic value.
However, compared to a mature company, the capital stock in a new business-particularly a 
Equation (1) is similar to the specification adopted by Lev and Radhakrishnan (2005) 
A key limitation of the VentureOne database is that it does not contain data about firms' assets or shareholder equity. I finesse this problem by modeling the dynamics of tangible capital as
Equation (3) permits TK i,t+1 to be expressed in terms of REV it , IK it and L it and therefore substituted out in equation (2).
Because venture-backed firms typically convert the external equity capital they raise from venture capitalists into intangible capital (say, by spending cash on patenting drugs) before they convert it back into tangible capital (say, by making large profits on the drugs), I propose that tangible capital depreciates, viz., 1 0 < < θ
. I also assume that the number of patents granted to a firm, NPAT it , is a proxy for its intangible capital in that
Taken together, equations (1) -(4) yield the following expression for one-year-ahead revenues:
Equation (5) delineates that firms' one-year-ahead revenues are positively autocorrelated and are increasing in the rate of growth in patents and total employees and the current stock or level of patents and employees. Moreover, after subtracting lnREV it from both sides of equation (5), it can be seen that equation (5) 
Second, venture-backed firms are characterized by high agency costs arising from the intangible nature of firms' key assets and from information asymmetries between entrepreneurs, managers and outside investors (Gompers and Lerner, 2000) . In response, venture investors provide management strong incentives to build equity value rather than consume perquisites.
Since early and rapid revenue growth is a necessary condition for creating equity value in most young technology companies, I add a dummy variable DUMSPLAN i to equation (5), where DUMSPLAN i is set to one if the firm has a sales commission plan in place and zero otherwise.
In light of the well established agency cost mitigation properties of compensation bonus plans (Healy, 1985; Tehranian and Wegelein, 1985; Holthausen et al., 1995; Banker et al., 2001 ), I
include a dummy variable DUMBPLAN i is set to one if the firm reports having a defined (as opposed to discretionary) bonus plan in place and zero otherwise.
Third, I accommodate the likelihood that the level and growth in revenues will depend on the degree to which a firm is converting tangible capital into longer-payback intangible capital rather than shorter-payback sales. That is, all else held constant, revenues are likely to be low when the firm is in the development or clinical trials stage of its life (assuming that these stages apply to the company) because in those stages the firm is deliberately taking the cash it has raised from venture investors and investing it into long-term intangible assets such as R&D and patents. I therefore add two dummy variables to equation (5) (10) 
The assumptions used to derive equation (10) I propose that h 1 > h 2 because sales commission plans are deliberately and causally put into place to increase revenues, whereas compensation bonus plans are less directly linked to sales revenue (being most commonly linked to earnings). I further propose that the signs on g 1 , g 2, … g M will vary depending on the job function involved. As highlighted in table 2, the VentureOne survey asks firms to report the number of employees in seven different job functions. In terms of equation (11), M = 7. I denote VentureOne's job functions as follows: administration (m = 1), business development (m = 2), finance (m = 3), marketing (m = 4), sales (m = 5), technical (m = 6), and noncategorized 'other' (m = 7). I propose that g 1 will be zero because administrative personnel are not hired to increase revenues but to control costs and facilitate the smooth internal running of the firm. The nature of business development, marketing and sales job functions dictate that g 2 , g 4 and g 5 should be positive. The necessity of raising external equity capital, the importance of managing internal cash flows and the more immediate sales payback of technical activities in venture-backed firms (which are often high-technology centered) suggest that g 3 and g 6 will be positive. Lastly, without knowing the activities of those employed in 'other' job functions, I do not make a sign prediction for g 7 . I do hypothesize, however, that g 7 < {g 2 , g 3 , g 4 , g 5 , g 6 } because the Other category of job function is a residual classification rather than a delineated area of employee skill or corporate responsibility.
As a result, the Other category is likely to contain job functions whose elasticity with regard to driving revenue is low.
Results
Simple correlations
In table 3 I report the correlations between firms' log transformed one-year-ahead revenue forecasts, denoted lnFREV, and the explanatory variables detailed in equation (11).
Pearson ( 
Primary regressions
The results of estimating equation (11) clinical trials stages of life. Also as predicted, the coefficient c on the current year number of patents is reliably larger than the coefficient d on the growth in patents (pr > F-statistic is less than 0.001), and the coefficient h 1 on the formal sales commission plan indicator is reliably larger than the coefficient on the coefficient h 2 on the defined bonus compensation plan indicator (pr > F-statistic is less than 0.001). Only the estimated coefficients on the current year number of patents and the defined bonus compensation plan indicator are inconsistent with predictions, both being insignificantly different from zero, rather than positive as hypothesized.
The log-linear nature of the regression means that coefficient estimates on logtransformed variables are elasticities. Thus, a one percent increase in firms' current period revenue is associated with a 0.59% increase in their forecasts of one-year-ahead revenue. 10 Per equation (3), the coefficient estimate of 0.59 on lnREV is consistent with the prediction that the coefficient will be positive but less than one (t-statistics with respect to zero and one are 27.5 and -19.1, respectively). The coefficient estimate of 0.59 on lnREV also implies that tangible capital depreciates rapidly in young venture-backed companies, with $100 of tangible capital in year t depreciating to only $15 in year t+1. I argue that this is not unreasonable since the average time between financing rounds for private venture-backed firms-i.e, the time it takes the typical firm to spend the capital it brings in at a typical financing round-is about a year (Hand, 2005c) .
In addition, the coefficient on the log growth rate in the forecasted total number of employees in model #1, namely 0.30, is close to the value of 0.38 found for publicly traded firms by Lev and Radhakrishnan (2005, job functions are all reliably positive, the estimated coefficient on the number of employees in administration is insignificantly different from zero. An F-test on the hypothesis that all employee coefficients are zero (viz., g 1 = g 2 = g 3 = g 4 = g 5 = g 6 = g 7 ) is soundly rejected.
Moreover, while the data indicates that employees in noncategorized 'other' job functions are expected to make positive contributions to future revenues, they do so at a rate that is on average half that of business development, finance, marketing, sales and technical employees (g 7 = 0.05 versus the average of {g 2 , g 3 , g 4 , g 5 , g 6 } = 0.11).
Both financial and nonfinancial data explain variation in firms' forecasts of their oneyear-ahead revenues. In model #1, the t-statistic on the sole financial variable, lnREV, is highly significant, and the (unreported) F-statistic on the null that all the coefficients on the 13 nonfinancial variables are zero is 18.5, with a p-value < 0.0001. However, financial information uniquely explains more of the cross-sectional variation in lnFREV than does nonfinancial information. Of model #1's adjusted R 2 of 81%, 13% is unique to financial information, 6% is unique to nonfinancial information, and 62% is common to both.
To most accurately identify the contributions made by different types of human capital skills, it is important to control for tangible capital. This is illustrated by comparing the estimated coefficient on the number of administrative employees across models #1 and #3. In model #3, which does not control for the effects of physical capital through current-period revenues, the estimated coefficient on the number of administrative employees is 0.20 (t-statistic = 3.4), whereas in model #1, which does control for the effects of physical capital, the estimated coefficient on the number of administrative employees is 0.00 (t-statistic = 0.1).
A comparison of the estimated coefficients on the growth in patents granted to firms in models #1 and #3 makes it clear that to most accurately identify the contribution to forecasted revenues made by intangible capital, one must properly control for firms' tangible capital. In model #3, which does not control for the effects of physical capital through current-period revenues, the estimated coefficient on the growth in patents is 0.07 (t-statistic = 0.7), whereas in model #1, which does control for the effects of physical capital, the estimated coefficient on the growth in patents is 0.30 (t-statistic = 3.6). It should also be noted that the log-linear specification of model #1 means that determinants of the log growth rate in forecasted revenues, ln[FREV/REV], obtain by simply subtracting one from the coefficient on lnREV. The coefficients on all other independent variables remain unchanged.
In table 5 agrees with this proposition. For example, although in all three industries one-year-ahead revenue forecasts are significantly positively related to the one-year forecasted growth rate in the total number of employees, the explanatory power of specialized job functions is higher in the Healthcare and Information Technology industries (with two out of five and four out of five estimated coefficients, respectively, being significantly positive as predicted) than in the Retail/Consumer/Business Products/Services sector (with no estimated coefficients being significantly different from zero). This supports the view that not all employees are created equal with regard to their ability to generate revenue, and that the value of specialized labor is higher the more intangible-intensive is a firm.
Finally, in agreement with the proposition that intangible assets play a larger role in generating revenue the more intangible-intensive the firm, revenues and revenue growth are increasing in the rate of patent growth for Healthcare and Information Technology firms but not for Retail/Consumer/Business Products/Services firms.
Robustness tests and threats to inferential validity
A variety of untabulated sensitivity tests indicate that the results in tables 4 and 5 are robust to a variety of potential threats to inferential reliability:
• Including the log age of the firm does not materially change the size or statistical significance of any of the coefficients in model #1. Moreover, the estimated coefficient on log firm age is always insignificantly different from zero.
• Excluding observations where the revenue category for both the most recently completed fiscal year and the forecasted year is the highest possible category (= 7) does not materially change the size or statistical significance of model #1's coefficients, with the exception of the t-statistic on the coefficient on the number of marketing employees, which is now only significantly positive at the 10% level under a one-tailed test. The reason for conducting this robustness check is that the upper-bounded nature of VentureOne's revenue categories means that a firm with very large and growing revenues will necessarily be coded as having zero forecasted revenue growth.
• Estimating model #1 using revenue categories rather than dollar revenues has no material effects on the signs or statistical significance of the model's estimated coefficients.
• Estimating model #1 separately for 2004 and 2005 yields coefficient estimates that are generally similar to those shown in table 4.
• Restricting the sample to only one observation per firm, thereby reducing the number of observations from 1,133 to 967, does not materially affect any results.
• Regressing the log of total employees on the logs of employees in the seven job functions yields an adjusted R 2 of 0.88. This confirms that equation (6) fits the data well. Conforming to intuition, all estimated slope coefficients lay between zero and one (the smallest is 0.09 and the largest is 0.35) and all the associated t-statistics exceed 4.3.
A separate and important concern is the threat to inferential validity stemming from a "size critique." The concern here is that one or more of the nonfinancial independent variables in tables 4 and 5 are acting as proxies for an omitted size variable. That is to say, for example, the estimated coefficient on the number of finance employees in model #1 in table 4 of 0.13 (tstatistic = 2.6) should not be interpreted as indicating that having more finance employees this year drives more sales revenue next year, but rather only that larger companies have larger sales next year and larger numbers of finance employees this year.
My view is that while the size critique deserves to be taken seriously, it is not likely to be a major source of inferential bias in the regressions reported in tables 4 and 5. First, there are strong reasons for expecting that the nonfinancial independent variables in the regressions truly do causally determine the dependent variable. For example, one can reasonably hypothesize that having more finance employees today means that it is more likely that the firm will secure its next round of venture funding and therefore be able to hire employees who will either sell the company's products directly, or make such sales activities possible. Second, although the coefficient on the number of administrative employees is significantly positive in model #3 when current period revenues are not controlled for-i.e., the type of relation predicted by the size critique-the same coefficient is insignificantly different from zero when current period revenues are controlled for. This suggests that to the extent that model #3 is misspecified in line with the size critique, current period revenues are highly correlated with size, and therefore the inclusion of current-period revenues greatly reduces any inferential bias with regard to the coefficient on the number of administrative employees.
6.
Limitations of the study
There are several limitations to this study, and in light of these the inferences I have made should be viewed with appropriate caution. First, per equations (8) The second limitation of note is that it is not unreasonable to conjecture that while firms' forecasts of their one-year-ahead revenues are unlikely to affect their projections of their patent log growth rates, ln[NPAT t+1 /NPAT t ], the same may less certain for firms' projections of the growth rate in their total employees, ln[FL t+1 /L t ]. This is because firms are more able to afford to hire more employees next year the larger is their revenue next year (particularly given the difficulty of quickly obtaining cash in the form of external equity or debt capital). As a result, the variable ln[FL t+1 /L t ] in tables 4 and 5 may well be endogenous, leading to inconsistent estimates of the OLS parameters on the independent variables. The difficulty in addressing this concern headon arises from the lack of plausible instruments for FL t+1 in VentureOne's database. 13 A modicum of comfort concerning the need to rely on OLS where a key independent variable is likely endogenous can be drawn from a recent paper by Larcker and Rusticus (2004) that critiques the use of instrumental variables in accounting research. The authors conclude that "Our analytical results and numerical simulations indicate that the instrumental variable (IV) approach typically used in accounting research is in many cases unlikely to produce estimates with desirable econometric properties. It can easily be the case that IV estimates are more biased than simple OLS estimates that make no explicit correction for endogeneity" (p.2).
The third major limitation is that this study is only able to use data from private venturebacked firms that had not exited when VentureOne undertook its surveys. Since the most successful venture-backed firms tend to rapidly go public, the firms used in this study are or will likely be less successful than the average venture-backed firm.
Other limitations include the fact that the data are restricted to two annual cross-sections of survey-based information provided voluntarily by firms. Such data may be of lower quality than data produced by publicly traded firms whose financial and nonfinancial disclosures are mandated and audited. It is also the case that data on the forecasted number of employees are end-of-year, not middle-of-year as required by the revenue production function laid out in equation (1). The study is limited to using patents as the sole proxy for firms' intangible assets and investment opportunities, at a minimum leading to noisy parameter estimates and possibly resulting in parameter estimates that suffer from material omitted correlated-variables bias.
Finally, a lack of data prevented me from controlling for variables that prior work with publicly traded companies has found relevant to explaining variation in sales revenue, such as order backlog (Liu et al., 1996) , customer satisfaction (Ittner and Larcker, 1998; Nagar and Rajan, 2005) and measures of product quality (Nagar and Rajan, 2001) . The same lack of data also means that I am unable to model or control for organization capital, which Lev and Radhakrishnan (2005) find to be an important contributor to corporate performance and growth.
Omitting these variables may mean that my estimates of the associations between firms' sales revenue and their people, patents and policies are biased.
7.
Conclusions
Seeking to add to the existing literature on the nonfinancial drivers of sales revenue, in this study I have explored the roles that people, patents, and policies play in determining firms' top-line sales revenue. These nonfinancial variables are economically important but have not been studied in the past because publicly traded firms disclose little detailed data about these aspects of their business. At the cost of diminished generalizability, I sought to finesse these information limitations by instead analyzing the rich and in-depth data collected by VentureOne in its confidential surveys of private venture-backed firms.
Using a Cobb-Douglas revenue production model, I proposed and found that the oneyear-ahead revenue forecasts made by managers of private venture-backed firms are larger the higher are firms' current revenues; the more rapid is the growth in their total personnel and the number of patents granted; the more business development, finance, marketing, sales, technical, and 'other' staff they employ; and when they have a formal sales commission plan in place.
Forecasted revenues are lower when firms are in development or clinical trials stages of life, but are uncorrelated with how many administrative employees a firm has and with the presence of a defined bonus compensation plan.
These findings add to our understanding of the relevance of nonfinancial information for predicting sales revenue and highlight the importance of such variables, particularly in young, fast-growing private technology companies. I also conclude that while it cannot be ruled out that revenue forecasts made by venture-backed companies are biased and/or otherwise distorted, my results indicate that it is very unlikely that they are purely the 'creative fiction' that is often alleged. Rather, they appear to reflect a variety of economically sensible financial and nonfinancial fundamentals. As such, and because of the increasing importance of young companies to the U.S. economy, further research into both the financial and nonfinancial drivers of firms' revenues seems warranted. had not yet filed for an IPO, merged or been acquired; and satisfied the data requirements described in table 1. The dependent variable is the log of the firm's forecast of its one-year-ahead revenues (in $000s). T-statistics computed using robust standard errors are in parentheses. An intercept is estimated but not reported. *, ** and *** denote coefficient estimates that are reliably significant at the 5%, 2.5% and 1% levels, respectively, under a one-tailed test of the predicted sign, unless there is no sign prediction, in which case the significance level pertains to a two-tailed test.
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